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Abstract
Participation in social programs is often misreported in survey data, com-
plicating the estimation of the effects of those programs. In this paper we
propose a model to estimate treatment effect under endogenous participa-
tion and endogenous misreporting. We show that failure to account for
endogenous misreporting can result in the estimates of the treatment effect
having opposite sign from the true effect. We present an expression for the
asymptotic bias of both OLS and IV estimators and discuss the conditions
under which sign reversal may occur. We provide a method of eliminating
this bias when researchers have access to information related to both par-
ticipation and misreporting. We establish the consistency and asymptotic
normality of our estimator and assess its small sample performance through
Monte Carlo simulations. An empirical example is given to illustrate the
method.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a solution to the problem of identification and estimation
of treatment effects in parametric regressions when participation is endogenously
misreported. In particular, we provide a two-step estimation procedure that con-
sistently estimates the conditional average treatment effect. Participation in social
programs is substantially misreported in survey data, sometimes with misreporting
levels as high as 50% (Meyer et al. 2009). When a binary regressor is misreported
(or misclassified), the measurement error is necessarily negatively correlated with
the underlying true value of the regressor, thus making the classical measurement
error assumptions implausible1. While earlier papers (Aigner 1973, Lewbel 2007)
show that exogenous misreporting leads to attenuation bias, we demonstrate that
the effects of endogenous misreporting are much more severe. To our knowledge,
this paper is the first attempt to address endogenous misreporting.
Misreporting occurs when program participants report not receiving treatment
when they actually did (“false negatives”) or vice versa (“false positives”). False
negatives are pervasive in practice and in many empirical studies. For example,
Lynch et al. (2007) and Meyer & Goerge (2011) report that validation studies
always find high rates of false negatives in the Food Stamps Program ranging
from 20% to 40%. Marquis & Moore (2010) and Meyer & Goerge (2011) find up
to 50% rate of false negatives in the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
False negatives are not confined to government programs. For example, accord-
ing to ?, there are a number of reasons to be suspicious of any survey response to
questions concerning self-evaluated health, not only because respondents are being
asked for subjective judgments, but also because responses may not be independent
of the outcomes we may wish to use them to explain.
1For empirical papers that discuss non-classical measurement errors with continuous explana-
tory variables, see, e.g., ?, ? and the references therein.
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Brachet (2008) argues that in health-related surveys, self-reported smoking sta-
tus is significantly misreported, with false negatives ranging from 3.4% in some
studies to 73% in others. Other instances of false negatives can be found in
the development literature where a firm’s formality status is often misreported,
with informal firms more likely to falsely report their statuses (see Gandelman &
Rasteletti 2013). In contrast, false positives are low; Meyer & Goerge (2011) find
that only less than 1% of non-recipients report food stamp receipt.
The existing literature has focused on accounting for random (exogenous) mis-
reporting when participation is exogenous. For instance, Aigner (1973) considers
misclassification in exogenous binary regressors, shows that OLS estimates are
biased downwards, and proposes a technique based on knowledge of the misclas-
sification probabilities to consistently estimate the parameters of interest. More
recently, Lewbel (2007) examines the identification and estimation of the treatment
effect of a misclassified binary regressor in nonparametric and semiparametric re-
gressions. Lewbel reaches the same attenuation-bias result that Aigner (1973)
finds and introduces assumptions that identify the conditional average treatment
effect of the misclassified binary regressor.
Some attempts have been made to address (exogenous) misreporting when
treatment selection (participation) is endogenous. In estimating the effect of Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) on health outcomes, Kreider
et al. (2012) use auxiliary administrative data on the size of SNAP caseloads to
address misreporting by bounding the average treatment effect under increasingly
stronger assumptions. While this partial identification approach identifies favor-
able treatment effects with their tightest bounds, it does not yield point estimates,
as such its relevance for policy making may not be widespread. In the education
literature, Kane et al. (1999) address misreporting when estimating returns to
schooling by proposing a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that
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relies on the existence of two categorical reports of educational attainment, and
so may have limited applicability. In estimating the effects of maternal smok-
ing on infant health, Brachet (2008) proposes a two-step GMM estimator, that
essentially follows Hausman et al. (1998) and Kane et al. (1999). An admitted
weakness of Brachet’s approach is the assumption that misreporting probabilities
are independent of covariates, conditional on treatment status.
This paper has three salient contributions. First, we propose a model of en-
dogenous misreporting and endogenous participation. We only analyze the case
of false negatives at this stage, which is the predominant case of misreporting
described in Meyer et al. (2009). Second, we show that OLS and IV estimators
are inconsistent when participation is endogenous and even when participation
is exogenous. We provide theoretical expressions for these biases and simulation
evidence showing that OLS estimates of treatment effects can be of opposite signs
from the true effects (sign reversal). Third, we propose an estimator that is root-n
consistent and asymptotically normal and show that it performs remarkably well
in small samples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of endogenous misreporting and shows the inconsistency of OLS and IV estima-
tors. Section 3 develops the proposed estimator. Section 4 provides Monte Carlo
simulations, Section 5 contains an empirical application and Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Framework
This section describes the proposed model and associated framework, and presents
our estimation strategy.
3
2.1 Model with Endogenous Misreporting
Consider the following specification of the usual treatment effects model. The
outcome variable, yi, is related to the k–vector of exogenous covariates, xi, and
the (true) participation indicator, δ∗i , by
yi = x
′
iβ + δ
∗
i α + i, (1)
and we model participation as
δ∗i = 1 (z
′
iθ + vi ≥ 0) , (2)
where α is a scalar capturing the treatment effect of interest, β and θ are parameter
vectors of sizes k× 1 and q× 1 respectively, zi is a q-vector of observed covariates,
and i and vi are possibly correlated error terms.
The researcher does not observe the true participation indicator δ∗i but only
a possibly misclassified surrogate, δi, contaminated by a misreporting unobserved
dummy variable, di, such that δi = δ
∗
i di. In other words, an individual correctly
reports her treatment status only if di = 1 and reports not receiving treatment
otherwise. We assume that misreporting, di, is related to a p-vector of observable
covariates wi such that
di = 1 (w
′
iγ + ui ≥ 0) (3)
where γ is a parameter vector of size p × 1 and ui is the error term. Hence, the
observed participation, δi, can be modeled by
δi = δ
∗
i di = 1 (z
′
iθ + vi ≥ 0, w′iγ + ui ≥ 0) . (4)
Our modeling of misreported participation is therefore similar to ?’s partial ob-
servability model. No restrictions are imposed on xi. However, we require the
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covariates zi and wi to be different but possibly overlapping, to avoid the local
identification problems discussed in ?. The joint distribution of the error terms is
given by
(i, ui, vi) ∼ N (0,Σ) , with Σ =

σ2 ϕuσ ϕvσ
ϕuσ 1 ρ
ϕvσ ρ 1
 , (5)
where σ2 is the variance of i, and ϕu, ϕv, ρ are the correlations between i and
ui, i and vi, ui and vi, respectively. Define the joint CDF of (−u,−v) by
F (u, v, ρ) = Pr[−ui ≤ u, −vi ≤ v], for any −∞ < u, v < +∞.
We make the following basic assumptions, which are standard in the literature.
Assumption 1. The vectors of regressors xi and zi are orthogonal to the error
terms i, ui and vi, and the vector of regressors wi is orthogonal to ui and vi.
Assumption 2. The k × k matrix E(xix′i) is nonsingular (and hence finite).
It is important to notice that unlike xi and zi, the exogeneity requirement does
not apply to wi, the covariates associated with misreporting in equation (3). This
could be of substantial interest in practice where exogenous covariates are often
difficult to find. In this framework, participation and misreporting are allowed to
be endogenous, with the latter only in one direction (i.e., only false negatives).
While we assume jointly normal disturbance terms for simplicity, normality is not
needed and the following discussion would hold for other absolutely continuous
distributions.
Our estimation strategy relies on observing z and w. We recognize that exclu-
sion restrictions for participation and misreporting may be difficult to obtain in
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practice and our suggestion is to rely on different data sources. For instance, ex-
clusion restrictions for participation may come from qualification laws (eligibility
requirements) for program participation. Covariates w could include peculiar fea-
tures of the survey in question and its administration such as survey date, length
of survey, etc., and the proportion of questions to which the individual refused to
respond.
2.2 Bias due to Endogenous Misreporting
We first show that a naive OLS estimator of the treatment effect is biased and
may assume a sign opposite to the true effect. Since the true participation status
δ∗i is unobserved but only δi is observed, the model with reported participation
status estimated by the researcher is given by
yi = x
′
iβ + δiα + εi. (6)
Given the true outcome equation defined by equation (1), equation (6) implicitly
implies that we have
εi = i + (δ
∗
i − δi)α. (7)
For a random sample of size n, equation (6) can be re-written in the matrix
form as
y = Xβ + δα + ε, (8)
where y = [y1, . . . , yn]
′, X = [x1, . . . , xn]′, δ = [δ1, . . . , δn]′, and ε = [ε1, . . . , εn]′.
Denote by α̂LS the OLS estimator obtained by naively estimating equation (6)
using reported participation δi. Then, we have the following result.
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Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the ordinary least squares estimator,
α̂LS, is biased and inconsistent, and the asymptotic bias is given by
plim(α̂LS − α) = A− αB
C
, (9)
with
A = E
[
σϕvφ (−z′iθ) Φ
(
w′iγ − ρz′iθ√
1− ρ2
)
+ σϕuφ (−w′iγ) Φ
(
z′iθ − ρw′iγ√
1− ρ2
)]
,
B = E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E[(δ∗i − δi)xi] and C = E(δi)− E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(δixi),
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are respectively the pdf and cdf of the standard normal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that since the denominator in (9), C, is always positive (by the Cauchy-
Schwarz Inequality, see, e.g. Tripathi (1999)), the sign of the asymptotic bias
only depends on the numerator of the expression. For example, if B > 0, then
plim(α̂LS) < α for all α > A/B (i.e. there is an attenuation bias). Also notice that
if B −C > 0, then plim(α̂LS) and α have opposite signs whenever α lays between
0 and A/(B − C). Figure 1 depicts the regions where bias and sign switching
occur. Note that sign-switching can occur even when participation is exogenous,
i.e., ϕv = 0.
This result shows that the bias related to endogenous misreporting is not merely
an attenuation bias as found in many other studies (e.g., Lewbel 2007). Rather, it
emphasizes that under endogenous misreporting the estimated treatment effect can
possibly assume an opposite sign, yielding misleading policy prescriptions. This
sign reversal would generally occur when misreporting is severe and the direction
of its correlation with outcome is opposite to the direction of the treatment effect.
For example, in the food stamp participation and obesity relationship, much em-
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Figure 1: Illustration of the OLS bias
pirical work have relied on self-reported food stamp participation and have found
a positive or no effect on obesity. But, if people who are overweight are also more
likely to misreport food stamp participation (i.e. A positive) and since, as men-
tioned above, misreporting in food stamp is very severe in the data (i.e. B positive
and large), then we could observe a positive relationship between food stamp par-
ticipation and obesity (i.e. plimαˆLS > 0) even if the true effect is negative (i.e.
α < 0).
In the next section, we provide an estimation strategy that allows consistent
estimation of the treatment effect, α. But first, we examine how well an IV esti-
mation strategy would perform in our framework.
2.3 IV Estimator under Endogenous Misreporting
The misreporting mechanism described above shows that in equation (6), the
regressor δi is correlated with the error term εi as implied by equation (7). Thus,
equation (1) can be seen as a regression with an endogenous binary regressor,
even if true participation is exogenous and only misreporting is endogenous. So it
may be tempting to suppose that if an instrument is present, then a standard IV
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estimator will address the issue raised in our framework. Here, we show that this
is not the case.
Suppose we have access to a valid instrumental variable, zi, such that E[ziεi] =
0 and Cov(zi, δi) 6= 0, and assume, for simplicity, that zi is a scalar so that α is
just identified. Then the (simple) instrumental variable estimator is given by
α̂IV = (z
′Mδ)−1z′My,
where M = I − X(X ′X)−1X ′ is the orthogonal projection matrix onto the null
space of X.
We can show using the same reasoning as above that,
plim(α̂IV ) =
E(ziδ∗i )− E(zix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(xiδ∗i )
E(ziδi)− E(zix′i)E(xix′i)−1E[xiδi]
α. (10)
Thus, the IV estimator of α is inconsistent, and we cannot sign the bias in gen-
eral. However, in the special case where misreporting is uncorrelated with true
participation and the other covariates, it can be shown that,
plim(α̂IV ) =
α
E[di]
=
α
Pr[di = 1]
> α.
Hence, in this specific scenario, the IV estimator is upwardly biased. This result
is similar to those obtained by Loewenstein & Spletzer (1997), and Black et al.
(2000). We now present an estimation procedure that delivers consistent and
asymptotically normal estimates for the treatment effect, α.
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3 The Proposed Estimator
Recall that our objective is to estimate α in the outcome equation (1), where true
(and possibly endogenous) participation status, δ∗i , is unobserved, but only a pos-
sibly misreported (and possibly endogenous) participation status, δi, is observed.
The proposed estimation strategy proceeds in the following two steps.
Step 1: With the joint distribution of ui and vi given by F (u, v, ρ), use the partial
observability probit model given by equation (4) to estimate the parameter
vectors θ and γ. Then, compute the predicted probability for person i’s
true participation status as δˆ∗i = Φ(z
′
iθˆ).
Step 2: Estimate equation (1) by substituting δˆ∗i for δ
∗
i . Assuming correct model
specification and distribution of the error terms, the resulting two-step
estimator of α is consistent. Moreover, with standard regularity assump-
tions, this estimator is asymptotically normal.
3.1 First-Step Estimation
Following ?, the parameters γ, θ and ρ can be jointly estimated from the joint
distribution of the error terms using the binary choice model defined by
Pr[δi = 1|wi, zi] = Pr [−ui ≤ w′iγ, − vi ≤ z′iθ] = F (w′iγ, z′iθ, ρ) = Pi(γ, θ, ρ).
The log-likelihood function of this model is given by
Ln(γ, θ, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
δi lnPi(γ, θ, ρ) + (1− δi) ln (1− Pi(γ, θ, ρ)) .
Assuming correct distributions, the maximum likelihood estimates of the pa-
rameters (γ, θ, ρ) are consistent and asymptotically normal, with the covariance
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matrix consistently estimated with the inverse of the information matrix. In par-
ticular, for the parameter θ, the MLE θˆ is consistent and asymptotically normal,
i.e.
θˆ
p−→ θ and √n(θˆ − θ) d−→N (0, Vθ) ,
where the asymptotic variance of θˆ is obtained from the information matrix
equality as
Vθ =
{
E
[
1
Pi(1− Pi)
∂Pi
∂θ
∂Pi
∂θ′
]}−1
. (11)
From this expression, a consistent estimator for the variance matrix can be ob-
tained as
V̂θ =
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
P̂i(1− P̂i)
∂P̂i
∂θ
∂P̂i
∂θ′
]−1
, (12)
where P̂i = Pi(γˆ, θˆ, ρˆ) = F
(
w′iγˆ, z
′
iθˆ, ρˆ
)
. Notice that for the normal case the
gradient takes a fairly simple form
∂P̂i
∂θ
= φ(z′iθˆ)Φ
(
w′iγˆ − ρˆz′iθˆ√
1− ρˆ2
)
zi
Computation of the maximum likelihood estimates are done through numerical
optimization.
3.2 Second-Step Estimation
In the second step, we compute the predicted values of true unobserved participa-
tion δ∗i , given by δˆ
∗
i = Φ(z
′
iθˆ) in the outcome equation in lieu of δ
∗
i and estimate
the new model given by
yi = x
′
iβ + δˆ
∗
i α + ηi. (13)
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Using the same approach as above, the second step estimator is obtain as
α̂2S = (δˆ
∗′Mδˆ∗)−1δˆ∗
′
My
=
∑n
i=1 Φ(z
′
iθˆ)yi −
∑n
i=1 Φ(z
′
iθˆ)x
′
i[
∑n
i=1 xix
′
i]
−1∑n
i=1 xiyi∑n
i=1 Φ(z
′
iθˆ)
2 −∑ni=1 Φ(z′iθˆ)x′i[∑ni=1 xix′i]−1∑ni=1 xiΦ(z′iθˆ)
(14)
We have the following consistency result.
Theorem 2. Under the model assumptions, the two-step estimator is consistent
for α, that is, α̂2S
p−→α.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that only the component θˆ of the parameter vector is used at this second
stage to predict the true unobserved participation status. The other components,
γˆ and ρˆ are only used in the computation of the asymptotic variance estimator,
as described below. We also have the following asymptotic normality result.
Theorem 3. Under the model assumptions the two-step estimator is asymptoti-
cally normal, i.e.,
√
n(α̂2S − α) d−→N(0, σ2α), with σ2α =
α2E[Λ2iΦ(z′iθ)(1− Φ(z′iθ))]
E[Λ2i ]2
+
σ2
E[Λ2i ]
,
where
Λi = Φ(z
′
iθ)− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1xi
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 A consistent estimator for the asymptotic variance
Theorem 3 gives the asymptotic variance of the treatment effect estimator, αˆ2S.
To perform inference based on αˆ2S it is useful to find a consistent estimator of this
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variance. One could use
σˆ2α =
αˆ22S νˆ
2
qˆ2
+
σˆ2
qˆ
(15)
where νˆ2, qˆ and σˆ2 are obtained respectively by
νˆ2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Λˆ2iΦ(z
′
iθˆ)
(
1− Φ(z′iθˆ)
)
(16)
qˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Λˆ2i (17)
σˆ2 =
1
n
∑
i
[(
yi − x′iβˆ − αˆ2SΦ(z′iθˆ)
)2
+ αˆ22SΦ(z
′
iθˆ)
(
1− Φ(z′iθˆ)
)]
, (18)
with
Λˆi = δˆ
∗
i −
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δˆ∗i x
′
i
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
′
i
)−1
xi
It should be noted again here that the estimation of the variance uses the nor-
mal CDF Φ(·) only because the normality of the error terms is assumed. Under
other distributional assumptions, Φ(·) and φ(·) can be replaced by the correspond-
ing CDF and PDF, respectively.
Summarizing, the outcome equation requires true participation status, δ∗,
which is unobserved by the econometrician. Given the observed participation, δ,
the first step in our estimation procedure amounts to a partial observability probit
analysis on the indicator variable δ using both z and w, which are respectively
the instrumental variables driving true participation and the covariates driving
misreporting. The result of this analysis is an estimator, θˆ, of θ, the coefficient of
z, which allows constructing a proxy δˆ∗ for truly being a participant. By construc-
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tion, this proxy is purged from both endogeneity and misreporting, and is then
used in lieu of δ∗ in the outcome equation of interest to derive a reliable treatment
effect estimator. The estimate θˆ obtained from the first step can then be used
along with the other model estimates to compute a consistent variance estimator
for the treatment effect estimator.
4 Monte Carlo Simulations
This section presents the results of Monte Carlo simulations comparing the pro-
posed two-step estimator (2S) with OLS and IV estimators. Our goal is to identify
and consistently estimate α, the (conditional) average treatment effect of partici-
pation, δ∗, on an outcome, y, given by equation (1). However, since (true) partici-
pation is unobserved, our task reduces to consistently estimating α from equation
(6) under the assumption that, observed (misclassified) participation, δ, arises
according to the process described by equations (3) and (4).
4.1 Simulation setup
The data generating process is simulated as follows. The true treatment indicator,
δ∗i , is given by
δ∗i = 1 (θ0 + θ1zi + vi ≥ 0) , where zi ∼ N(0, 1), θ1 = 10, θ0 = 0.1.
The outcome equation yi is given by
yi = β0 + xiβ1 + δ
∗
i α + i where xi ∼ N(0, 1) β0 = β1 = 1, α = −0.2.
Note that α = −0.2 is the true population treatment effect we seek to estimate.
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As previously discussed, the econometrician only observes an error-ridden treat-
ment indicator, δi, defined by
δi = δ
∗
i 1 (γ0 + γ1wi + ui ≥ c) , where wi ∼ N(0, 2), γ1 = 100, γ0 = 0.2.
The parameter c is a threshold that determines the proportion of false negatives in
the sample.2 The disturbances i, ui and vi are drawn from a trivariate distribution
given by
(i, ui, vi) ∼ N (0,Σ) , where Σ =

σ2 ϕuσ ϕvσ
ϕuσ 1 ρ
ϕvσ ρ 1
 , σ = 1, ρ = 0.
The values of the correlation parameters ϕv and ϕu are varied in the simulations
to examine how various degrees of the endogeneity of participation and misre-
porting affect the results. We estimate the treatment effect α and the associated
bias using the naive OLS approach αˆLS and the proposed two-step approach αˆ2S.
We also estimate the instrumental variable estimator αˆIV using both z and w as
instruments.
4.2 Simulation Results
We report simulation results averaged over 1000 replications each with sample
size 5000 for different levels of false negatives - 5%, 10%, 20%, 40% - for ϕu ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.8} and ϕv ∈ {−0.5, 0, 0.5}, where ϕu and ϕv are the correlations of the
outcome equation with misreporting and participation, respectively. The cases of
exogenous participation and exogenous misreporting correspond to ϕu = ϕv = 0.
Table (1) presents the results of the Monte Carlo simulations for OLS, IV, and
2By appropriately choosing the value of c, one can simulate varying rates of misreporting.
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the proposed two-step (2S) estimators. We report both the OLS estimates using
the true treatment indicator, δ∗i (True Participation) and the observed treatment
effect δi (Observed Participation). Although δ
∗
i is unobserved to the econometri-
cian, these estimates provide a theoretical benchmark for the estimates obtained
using the misclassified δi.
The naive OLS estimates, α̂LS, using δi (OLS Observed Participation) show
that, not only is the OLS estimator inconsistent as asserted in Theorem 1, but also
yields wrong (i.e. positive) signs, whether participation is exogenous or endoge-
nous. Sign-switching is observed at all false negative rates i.e. 5%, 10%, 20% and
40% and is more pronounced at higher values of ϕu. These results persist even
under the special case of exogenous misreporting (ϕu = 0). The IV estimates,
α̂IV , are reported in the column (IV). In the estimation, the vector of instruments
for δi is given by [1 xi zi wi], since wi is also exogenous in this setting.
3 When
participation is endogenous, the results show, as we expect, that OLS is biased
and inconsistent. However, perhaps surprisingly, the results show that the classic
IV estimator is also inconsistent and sometimes worse, albeit keeping the correct
(negative) sign.4
In contrast, the proposed two-step estimator (2S), presented in the last column
of Table 1, yields consistent estimates of the true treatment effect and by com-
parison, is superior to both the OLS and IV estimators under both endogenous
and exogenous misreporting or participation. Interestingly, the proposed estima-
3This is actually a better set of simulations for the IV because the covariate wi can be used as
an additional instrument to improve the IV. Unreported simulations with wi being endogenous,
that is, the vector of instruments for δi is [1 xi zi], yielded worse results for the IV.
4The correct sign for the IV arises because misreporting and true participation are uncorre-
lated in this simulation setup. However, as shown in Section 2.3, we cannot generally sign the
bias in the IV estimator.
16
Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulations
False ϕu ϕv
OLS
IV 2STrue Observed
Negatives Participation Participation
5%
0
-0.5 -0.766 -0.724 -0.204 -0.201
0 -0.200 -0.189 -0.202 -0.200
0.5 0.365 0.345 -0.200 -0.198
0.2
-0.5 -0.765 -0.712 -0.204 -0.200
0 -0.201 -0.179 -0.204 -0.201
0.5 0.366 0.357 -0.203 -0.200
0.8
-0.5 -0.764 -0.679 -0.201 -0.198
0 -0.200 -0.145 -0.202 -0.199
0.5 0.365 0.388 -0.203 -0.201
10%
0
-0.5 -0.765 -0.689 -0.199 -0.201
0 -0.199 -0.179 -0.197 -0.199
0.5 0.365 0.329 -0.197 -0.199
0.2
-0.5 -0.766 -0.672 -0.198 -0.201
0 -0.199 -0.162 -0.199 -0.200
0.5 0.363 0.345 -0.198 -0.201
0.8
-0.5 -0.765 -0.617 -0.200 -0.202
0 -0.200 -0.109 -0.194 -0.196
0.5 0.365 0.400 -0.197 -0.200
20%
0
-0.5 -0.765 -0.624 -0.181 -0.201
0 -0.200 -0.163 -0.173 -0.197
0.5 0.364 0.297 -0.177 -0.201
0.2
-0.5 -0.765 -0.592 -0.178 -0.201
0 -0.200 -0.133 -0.178 -0.201
0.5 0.365 0.328 -0.174 -0.199
0.8
-0.5 -0.764 -0.503 -0.177 -0.199
0 -0.202 -0.045 -0.180 -0.202
0.5 0.363 0.415 -0.176 -0.201
40%
0
-0.5 -0.764 -0.526 -0.138 -0.199
0 -0.200 -0.138 -0.141 -0.201
0.5 0.366 0.251 -0.141 -0.200
0.2
-0.5 -0.765 -0.481 -0.139 -0.200
0 -0.200 -0.092 -0.137 -0.198
0.5 0.365 0.297 -0.143 -0.202
0.8
-0.5 -0.764 -0.342 -0.140 -0.199
0 -0.201 0.046 -0.144 -0.203
0.5 0.365 0.436 -0.139 -0.199
Notes. The true treatment effect is α = −0.2. Each calibration in the Monte Carlo Design involved 1000
replications each of size 5000. We report results for four false negative rates (5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%) i.e. the
proportion of true participants who misreport their status. ϕv and ϕu are correlations that indicate the extents
of endogeneity of participation and misreporting, respectively.
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tor remains accurate and performs remarkably well, even when the rate of false
negatives is substantially high in the data.
There are few additional facts that are worth mentioning. Although only one
set of parameter values are presented here, we also ran the model with different
parameter values and distributions. While the magnitudes of the bias for OLS
and IV were sensitive to the values of parameters the consistency of the proposed
estimator (2S) was not affected by parameter choice. Finally, Lewbel (2007)’s esti-
mator also worked well in our setting for the special cases where both participation
and misreporting where exogenous.5 However, Lewbel’s estimator displayed large
biases and sign reversals under some endogeneity cases, which is not surprising
since this limitation is clearly emphasized in Lewbel (2007). These additional
results are available from the authors upon request.
5 The Impact of SNAP Participation on Obesity
We consider an empirical application examining the impact of the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 6 on adult obesity when participation status
is potentially misreported. We present estimates of SNAP’s effect on Body Mass
Index (BMI) based on OLS, IV, and our proposed two-step (2S) estimators using
the 1998 wave of the restricted-use National Longitudinal Survey of Youth - 1979
(NLSY79).
The impact of SNAP on obesity is theoretically ambiguous. One the one hand,
SNAP benefits loosen budget constraints of households, allowing them to make
healthier food choices and engage in less-sedentary activities that could lead to
5It is easy to slightly modify our set up to include the instrumental variable required by
Lewbel’s identification strategy. For that purpose, we added a binary indicator in the true
participation equation, since, as explained by Lewbel (2007), only two points of support are
needed for the instrument to identify the treatment effect if the rate of false positives is zero (as
in our case).
6SNAP was formerly known as the Food Stamp Program.
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reductions in weight status. On the other hand, the income effect from SNAP
could lead to greater consumption of unhealthy food (more calories) and more
sedentary activities that could lead to increases in weight status. A third possibility
is that SNAP benefits could be too little to significantly affect weight outcomes.
Depending on the proportion of recipients that are inframarginal and the types of
food purchased, SNAP may positively or negatively impact obesity.
Previous studies on the relationship between SNAP and obesity have found
positive effects (??), negative effects (??), and no effect (?). These mixed results
reflect two identification challenges in evaluating the causal effects of SNAP: self-
selection and the misreporting of participation status. Although some previous
studies have employed instrumental variable methods to address endogenous se-
lection into SNAP, very few attempts have been made to also address misreporting
of participation status. We demonstrate how our proposed estimator can be useful
for empiricists in this context.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by SNAP Participation Status
SNAP
Participants
Non-
SNAP
Participants
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Body Mass Index (BMI) 28.22 6.88 27.50 6.09
Age (years) 36.70 2.32 36.88 2.29
Hispanic 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28
Black 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.40
Mother’s Education (> High School) 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29
Female 0.72 0.45 0.54 0.50
Number of Observations 451 1767
Notes. Summary statistics (weighted sample means and standard deviations)
are based on the 1998 wave of the NLSY79, restricted to individuals or households
with income below 250% of the federal poverty line.
Misreporting of SNAP participation in national surveys has been well-documented
with false negatives being more prevalent than false positives. For instance, false
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negatives for SNAP are estimated to be around 20−30% in the 2001 and 2004 pan-
els of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) (?), up to 50% in
the 2002-2005 CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (?), about 20− 40%
in the 2001 American Community Survey (ACS) (?), about 26% in the 2008-2010
ACS (?), and 23 − 45% in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) -
1979 cohort (?). However, false positives are low and typically less than 1% (Meyer
& Goerge 2011).
Recall that the observed model to be estimated is given by
yi = x
′
iβ + δiα + εi, (19)
where yi, the dependent variable is BMI
7, xi is the set of independent variables, δi
is the SNAP participation indicator that is endogenous and possibly systematically
misreported, and εi is the disturbance term. For the purpose of this illustration,
xi includes age, gender, race, and mother’s education. Table 2 reports summary
statistics (means and standard deviations) by SNAP participation status. The
average BMI for SNAP participants is 28.22 while it is 27.50 for nonparticipants.
The summary statistics indicate that SNAP participants are more likely to be
Hispanic (0.11 vs. 0.09), black (0.35 vs. 0.20), and female (0.72 vs. 0.54).
To implement the 2S estimator, two sets of covariates need to be distinguished:
covariates related to participation (zi in equation (2)) and covariates related to mis-
reporting (wi in equation (3)). The covariates for participation are set equal to
the independent variables in equation (19) in addition to two exclusion restric-
tions: whether the respondent’s state uses a biometric identification technology
–“Biometric”– and the percentage of SNAP benefits issued by the state via direct
mail – “Direct Mail” (?). Intuitively, these state-level policies affect a person’s
SNAP participation decision by changing the transaction costs of participation
7BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
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but should not directly affect adult weight outcomes.
Our proposed estimator also exploits available information in the NLSY79 re-
lating to why respondents might misreport their SNAP participation status. In-
teresting candidates in this regard are interview or survey characteristics. For
the covariates related to misreporting (wi), the set of independent variables in
the outcome equation (19) are augmented with a binary indicator for whether the
interview was conducted by telephone or in person.8
Table 3: The Impact of SNAP on BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
Variable OLS IV 2S
SNAP Dummy 0.2012 -5.6678 -1.4258
(0.3569) (5.6084) (2.1954)
Age 0.0881 0.0472 0.0755
(0.0581) (0.0751) (0.0615)
Hispanic 1.9062*** 2.3877*** 2.1534***
(0.3431) (0.5871) (0.4990)
Black 1.7231*** 2.4242*** 2.0305***
(0.3037) (0.7500) (0.5302)
Mother’s Educ. 0.8391 0.9438 0.8715*
(0.5894) (0.6262) (0.4906)
Female 0.4537 1.2398 0.6330*
(0.2598) (0.7921) (0.3557)
Intercept 23.431*** 25.2625*** 24.2445***
(2.1238) (2.9384) (2.4631)
Notes. Results are based on the 1996 wave of the NLSY79,
restricted to individuals or households with income below 250%
of the federal poverty level.
Standard errors in parenthesis. “ *** ”p < 0.01, “ ** ”p < 0.05,
“ * ”p < 0.1
Table 3 reports OLS, conventional IV and our two-step (2S) estimates. The
8About 24.6% of interviews conducted in the 1998 wave of the NLSY79 were by telephone.
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Table 4: First Stage Results for IV Estimator
Variable Dependent Variable: SNAP Dummy
Biometric 0.0717***
(.0260)
Direct Mail 0.0080
(0.0254)
Global F-statistic 3.81**
Hansen J-statistic 0.002
Standard errors in parenthesis. “ *** ”p < 0.01, “ ** ”p < 0.05, “ * ”p < 0.1
three approaches give completely different and sometimes opposite results. The
OLS method estimates a positive and significant effect of SNAP participation on
BMI. The average BMI difference between SNAP participants and non-participants
is estimated at 0.2 BMI units, everything else equal. In contrast, our proposed
estimator yields a negative (albeit insignificant) effect of SNAP participation on
BMI. Food Stamp participants are found to be less heavier than non-participants,
with a BMI difference of 1.43. Relative to the mean height of 65.75 inches, the 2S
estimator suggests that SNAP participation is associated with a reduction of 8.75
pounds on average. Interestingly, however, all the remaining coefficients besides
that on the SNAP participation indicator from both OLS and 2S are similar in
sign and magnitude.
The conventional IV estimator, on the other hand, yields the same sign as the
proposed estimator but is more than 3 times bigger in magnitude. This expansion
bias or inflation of the IV is similar to results obtained in Brachet (2008)’s analysis
of the relationship between smoking and infant health. The conventional IV esti-
mator uses the same set of instruments for participation as our proposed estimator
(i.e., “Biometric” and “Direct Mail”). Table 4 presents the first stage results for
the IV estimator. The first stage regression yields significant global F-statistic and
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low and insignificant Hansen J-statistic, implying the instruments are sufficiently
correlated with observed SNAP participation status.
These results from the empirical illustration corroborate the simulations results
obtained in Section 4: (i) there is a possible sign reversal between the OLS and
the 2S estimates 9; (ii) the IV and the 2S estimators have the same sign but the
IV has a larger magnitude. In addition, the results obtained from these methods
lead to radically different and possibly contradictory policy advice.
This empirical illustration is undoubtedly limited and the results should be
interpreted with caution since they are only suggestive. For instance, even if
our proposed estimator estimates α consistently, it may not represent a causal
effect of SNAP on obesity due to possible confounding by omitted variables in this
application. Subject to these caveats, the discussions above suggest that the OLS
and IV estimators are likely biased, with the OLS yielding a positive effect while
the IV gives an implausibly large magnitude. These biases might be symptomatic
of severe misreporting of SNAP participation.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the identification and estimation of the conditional average
treatment effect of a binary regressor in the presence of endogenous misreport-
ing and possibly endogenous participation. We derive and prove the consistency
and asymptotic normality of our proposed two-step estimator and show that OLS
and IV estimators are inconsistent and may yield wrong (opposite) signs. We
also provide Monte Carlo simulations to this effect, and apply our method to an
empirical example examining the impact of food stamps participation on obesity
9Note that the sign reversal phenomenon obtained in this empirical illustration is neither a
general result nor does its nonoccurrence invalidate the results herein. See Section 2.2 for further
discussions.
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using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) - 1979 co-
hort. We find that the estimated effect of SNAP participation on BMI using our
approach is negative, but turns out to be positive when misreporting is ignored
(OLS approach).
Previous studies on misclassified binary regressors are mostly concerned with
exogenous or random misreporting (Aigner 1973, Brachet 2008, Lewbel 2007, Ma-
hajan 2006, Frazis & Loewenstein 2003), where it is commonly assumed that,
misclassification probabilities depend only on the true treatment status and thus,
independent of measurement errors and other regressors. Our two-step estimator
relaxes this arguably strong assumption and shows that, when the researcher has
access to information related to why individuals misreport, the treatment effect
can be consistently estimated.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at addressing endogenous
misreporting. This is important because of the prevalence of misreporting in public
programs and survey data (Meyer et al. 2009, Bollinger 1996, Kane & Rouse 1995,
Kane et al. 1999, Brachet 2008). While this paper focused on one-way endogenous
misreporting when participation is possibly endogenous, future work should allow
for bidirectional misreporting (i.e. false negatives and false positives). It would
also be useful to show the level of dependence of our approach on distributional
and functional form assumptions by considering parametric or semi-parametric
estimation approaches.
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof.
Biasedness: By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem, see, e.g. Davidson & MacKin-
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non (2004, page 68), the regression
My = Mδα + v
yields the same least squares estimate of α as the regression equation of interest
(8). It follows that,
α̂LS = (δ
′Mδ)−1δ′My. (20)
This implies that α̂LS − α = (δ′Mδ)−1δ′Mε.
Hence, E[α̂LS − α|X, δ] = (δ′Mδ)−1δ′ME[ε|X, δ] 6= 0, since E[ε|δ,X] 6= 0 by
the correlation of ε and δ through u and v.
Inconsistency: We can write
α̂LS − α = (δ′Mδ)−1δ′M =
(
δ′Mδ
n
)−1
δ′Mε
n
=
(
δ′Mδ
n
)−1(
δ′M
n
+
δ′M(δ∗ − δ)α
n
)
by Equation (7) (21)
Notice that,
δ′Mδ
n
=
δ′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]δ
n
=
δ′δ
n
− δ
′X
n
(
X ′X
n
)−1
X ′δ
n
Hence, by the Weak Law of Large Numbers and the Slutsky’s lemma, we have
δ′Mδ
n
p−→E(δ2i )− E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(δixi)
By a matrix extension of the Cauchy-Shwarz inequality (see Tripathi 1999), we
know that E(δ2i )−E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(δixi) > 0. The Continuous Mapping Theorem
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then implies that
(
δ′Mδ
n
)−1
p−→ [E(δ2i )− E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(δixi)]−1 . (22)
Likewise, the term
δ′M
n
can also be decomposed as
δ′M
n
=
δ′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]
n
=
δ′
n
− δ
′X
n
(
X ′X
n
)−1
X ′
n
.
Then, using the same arguments as above we have
δ′M
n
p−→E(δii)− E(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E(xii) = E(δii),
where the last equality follows from Assumption 1.
Using the expression of δi given by Equation (4) and the trivariate normality
of (i, ui, vi), it can be shown by integration that
E[δii] = E [i1 (z′iθ + vi ≥ 0, w′iγ + ui ≥ 0)]
= E [Pr[ui ≥ −w′iγ, vi ≥ −z′iθ, ρ]E [i|ui ≥ −w′iγ, vi ≥ −z′iθ]]
= E
[
σϕvφ (−z′iθ) Φ
(
w′iγ − ρz′iθ√
1− ρ2
)
+ σϕuφ (−w′iγ) Φ
(
z′iθ − ρw′iγ√
1− ρ2
)]
,
where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the CDF and PDF of the standard normal. It follows that
δ′M
n
p−→E
[
σϕvφ (−z′iθ) Φ
(
w′iγ − ρz′iθ√
1− ρ2
)
+ σϕuφ (−w′iγ) Φ
(
z′iθ − ρw′iγ√
1− ρ2
)]
. (23)
Finally, using the same reasoning as above for the term
δ′M(δ∗ − δ)α
n
, we have
δ′M(δ∗ − δ)α
n
p−→ − αE(δix′i)E(xix′i)−1E[(δ∗i − δi)xi]. (24)
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The desired result follows by taking (24), (23) and (22) to Equation (21).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We can write
α̂2S = (δˆ
∗′Mδˆ∗)−1δˆ∗
′
Mδ∗α + (δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗)−1δˆ∗
′
M (25)
By the exogeneity of X and Z given by Assumption 1, the consistency of θˆ,
the continuity of Φ(·) and the law of large numbers, we have
δˆ∗
′
M
n
p−→E[Φ(z′iθ)i] = E [Φ(z′iθ)E[i|zi]] = 0,
so that the second term on the RHS of Equation (25) goes to zero. We also have,
by Assumption 2, the consistency of θˆ, the continuity of Φ(·) and the the law of
large numbers,
δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗
n
p−→E [Φ(z′iθ)2]− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1E [Φ(z′iθ)xi]
and
δˆ∗
′
Mδ∗
n
p−→ E [Φ(z′iθ)δ∗i ]− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1E [xiδ∗i ]
= E [Φ(z′iθ)E[δ∗i |zi]]− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1E [xiE[δ∗i |zi]]
= E
[
Φ(z′iθ)
2
]− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1E [xiΦ(z′iθ)]
where the last display follows from the fact that E[δ∗i |zi] = Φ(z′iθ), as implied by
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Equation (2). Hence,
(δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗)−1δˆ∗
′
Mδ∗ =
(
δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗
n
)−1
δˆ∗
′
Mδ∗
n
p−→ 1
so that
α̂2S
p−→α
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We can write
√
n(α̂2S − α) =
(
δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗
n
)−1(
δˆ∗
′
M(δ∗ − δˆ∗)√
n
)
α +
(
δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗
n
)−1
δˆ∗
′
M√
n
= q−1n
[√
nV1nα +
√
nV2n
]
(26)
where
qn =
δˆ∗
′
Mδˆ∗
n
, V1n =
δˆ∗
′
M(δ∗ − δˆ∗)
n
, and V2n =
δˆ∗
′
M
n
Denote Λˆi = δˆ
∗
i −
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δˆ
∗
i x
′
i
)(
1
n
∑n
i=1 xix
′
i
)−1
xi and by Λi = Φ(z
′
iθ) −
E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1xi its probability limit. We know, from the consistency results
above that
qn
p−→ q = E [Φ(z′iθ)2]− E [Φ(z′iθ)x′i]E[xix′i]−1E [Φ(z′iθ)xi] = E[Λ2i ]. (27)
Also, by a direct application of the central limit theorem,
√
nV1n
d−→N(0, ν2), where
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ν2 = plim
1
n
n∑
i=1
Λˆ2i (δ
∗
i − δˆ∗i )2 = E[Λ2iΦ(z′iθ)(1− Φ(z′iθ))] (28)
Likewise, by the central limit theorem,
√
nV2n
d−→N(0, σ22), where
σ22 = plim
1
n
n∑
i=1
Λˆ2i 
2
i = σ
2E[Λ2i ] = σ2q (29)
Finally, the asymptotic covariance term between the elements of
√
nV1n and
√
nV2n
is
plim
1
n
n∑
i=1
Λˆ2i (δ
∗
i − δˆ∗i )i = E[Λi(δ∗i − Φ(z′iθ))i] = 0
It then follows from Slutsky’s Lemma, (26), (27), (28) and (29) that
√
n(α̂2S − α) d−→N(0, σ2α), where
σ2α =
α2ν2
q2
+
σ2
q
=
α2E[Λ2iΦ(z′iθ)(1− Φ(z′iθ))]
E[Λ2i ]2
+
σ2
E[Λ2i ]
References
Aigner, D. J. (1973), ‘Regression with a binary independent variable subject to
errors of observation’, Journal of Econometrics 1(1), 49–59.
Black, D. A., Berger, M. C. & Scott, F. A. (2000), ‘Bounding parameter esti-
mates with nonclassical measurement error’, Journal of the American Statistical
Association 95(451), 739–748.
29
Bollinger, C. R. (1996), ‘Bounding mean regressions when a binary regressor is
mismeasured’, Journal of Econometrics 73(2), 387–399.
Brachet, T. (2008), ‘Maternal smoking, misclassification, and infant health’, Mis-
classification, and Infant Health (September 16, 2008) .
Davidson, R. & MacKinnon, J. G. (2004), Econometric theory and methods, Vol. 5,
Oxford University Press New York.
Frazis, H. & Loewenstein, M. A. (2003), ‘Estimating linear regressions with
mismeasured, possibly endogenous, binary explanatory variables’, Journal of
Econometrics 117(1), 151–178.
Gandelman, N. & Rasteletti, A. (2013), ‘Credit constraints, sector informality and
firm investments: Evidence from a panel of uruguayan firms’.
Hausman, J. A., Abrevaya, J. & Scott-Morton, F. M. (1998), ‘Misclassification of
the dependent variable in a discrete-response setting’, Journal of Econometrics
87(2), 239–269.
Kane, T. J. & Rouse, C. E. (1995), ‘Labor-market returns to two-and four-year
college’, The American Economic Review pp. 600–614.
Kane, T. J., Rouse, C. E. & Staiger, D. (1999), Estimating returns to schooling
when schooling is misreported, Technical report, National bureau of economic
research.
Kreider, B., Pepper, J. V., Gundersen, C. & Jolliffe, D. (2012), ‘Identifying the
effects of snap (food stamps) on child health outcomes when participation is
endogenous and misreported’, Journal of the American Statistical Association
107(499), 958–975.
30
Lewbel, A. (2007), ‘Estimation of average treatment effects with misclassification’,
Econometrica 75(2), 537–551.
Loewenstein, M. A. & Spletzer, J. R. (1997), ‘Delayed formal on-the-job training’,
Industrial & labor relations review 51(1), 82–99.
Lynch, A. G., Marioni, J. C. & Tavare´, S. (2007), ‘Numbers of copy-number vari-
ations and false-negative rates will be underestimated if we do not account for
the dependence between repeated experiments’, American journal of human ge-
netics 81(2), 418.
Mahajan, A. (2006), ‘Identification and estimation of regression models with mis-
classification’, Econometrica 74(3), 631–665.
Marquis, K. H. & Moore, J. C. (2010), ‘Measurement errors in sipp program
reports’, Survey Methodology 1.
Meyer, B. D. & Goerge, R. (2011), ‘Errors in survey reporting and imputation
and their effects on estimates of food stamp program participation’, US Census
Bureau Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-WP-11-14 .
Meyer, B. D., Mok, W. K. & Sullivan, J. X. (2009), ‘The under-reporting of
transfers in household surveys: its nature and consequences’, National Bureau
of Economic Research .
Tripathi, G. (1999), ‘A matrix extension of the cauchy-schwarz inequality’, Eco-
nomics Letters 63, 1–3.
31
